
Over the period of the last decade, what came to be known as the ‘euro crisis’ evolved as a rather complex topic. For academic scholars taking a political science perspective, approaching the rapid dynamics of European crisis management not only requires an understanding of the political economy of the European economic and monetary union (EMU), but also a profound knowledge of the heterogeneous actors and numerous institutions involved in the politics of the European Union (EU). *Tangled Governance* offers both, a comprehensive and detailed account of European crisis management over the especially significant period of country programmes from 2010 to 2015, and an interesting and analytically innovative approach that links discussions of global governance to regime complexity in a way that speaks well to what we know about politics in the multilevel governance system of the EU.

The book lays out its analytical approach, combining more state-centred perspectives of international relations and global governance with the analytical tools of theories of regime complexity. By doing so, the book develops an innovative and interesting argument, which is that ‘regime complexity is the consequence of a strategy of key states to manage agency drift’. This argument convincingly helps to understand key questions of EMU governance over the crisis period, such as those dealing with the choice of institutional mix and strategies of key states – especially with regard to the rather surprising inclusion of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It further contributes to our understanding of the simultaneous co-operation and competition among the complex set of institutions involved in dealing with the so-called ‘euro crisis’. The book traces this argument in seven empirically rich studies of country programme cases over the period from the first Greek programme in 2010 until the third programme of that country in 2015. All of this is embedded in a convincing analytical framework that is, in its potential for generalization and future research, also well addressed in the concluding chapter of the book. Further, it offers a complete discussion of key actors involved in the tangled emergency politics, including key individuals in the institutions comprising the ‘Troika’ and the numerous new institutions and facilities that were designed during the crisis period.

Given *Tangled Governance*’s impressive empirical richness and its very convincing theoretical argument, the book is highly recommendable as a comprehensive account of the complex governance issues of the crisis period and the equally numerous as well as heterogeneous actors and institutions involved. The very well prepared data on the conditions of the country programmes together with its hint towards the important role of the United States of America and the IMF in the European governance regime offers valuable insights for both scholars searching for an inclusive account of the complex politics and governance mechanisms of the period in question, and those scholars interested in EU studies that want to learn more about the complex regime of European multilevel governance from a more international and global governance perspective.

SEBASTIAN HEIDEBRECHT
*University of Duisburg-Essen*